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Abstract
The consensus scientific view holds that our world is indeterministic at the micro level,
but practically deterministic at all other levels. In an indeterministic world, live alternative
possibilities at the moment of decision render it impossible for agents to guarantee what they
will choose; regardless of their personality and deliberative processes. Critics of indeterminist
free will argue that this lack of a necessary connection between mental state and choice makes
the ultimate decision fundamentally a matter of luck. As such, indeterminism opens free will up
to potential problems of present luck. Additionally, large-scale determinism opens up free will to
a separate “luck pincer”. Our initial set of beliefs, desires and deliberative patterns (endowment)
are settled by luck. Since our initial endowment forms our initial character, only (lucky) factors
outside ourselves can modify it. Our decisions and characters are practically determined by
either luck in our initial endowment or in the outside circumstances that modify it. In order to
defuse these objections, free will defenders must develop an answer to both the problem of
present luck and the determinist “luck pincer” presented by Neil Levy. I will argue that the
problem of present luck is resolvable by applying a modified version of Frankfurt cases to the
actual sequence of decisions. In the majority of these cases, I argue indeterminism plays no
significant freedom-endangering role. Additionally, I will argue that the luck pincer is not lethal
to free will since our endowments constitute our characters, desires and beliefs. I will argue that
decisions that decisions originating from our endowments constitute a direct outpouring of our
identities, and such decisions are free. The aim of my paper is to present responses to
contemporary luck objections relevant to all views, particularly those aiming to defend free will in
the world agents most likely inhabit.
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0. Introduction
Many defenders of the existence of free will worry that living in a deterministic world- one
where all future actions follow necessarily from facts about the present-would render robust free
will impossible. Fischer asks readers to, “Suppose, for example, that a consortium of wellrespected scientists announce...that all events that all events can in principle be fully explained
by previous events and the laws of nature”1 and develops an account of free will to preempt this
possibility. But is a deterministic world really a step in the wrong direction? The current
scientific consensus holds that due to the individually unpredictable but statistically irrelevant
quantum fluctuations, the world is technically indeterministic2, but practically deterministic.
Suppose a consortium of scientists were to announce tomorrow that the consensus view today
were confirmed beyond doubt; would the implications of this discovery comfort proponents of
free will? There is strong reason to believe the answer is no. By pointing out that the actual
world is both indeterministic in one relevant sense and deterministic in another, the scientific
consensus view opens up free will to luck objections to both indeterminist and determinist
accounts of free will.
A formulation of the problem of present luck asserts that the role genuine randomness
plays in human decision-making makes it “a matter of luck that the agent chooses, or is the

1

Fischer p.6
For a more detailed example of similar sentiments in the literature, see Kane, “A Contemporary
Introduction to Free Will” p 7-10
2
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source of, the action she actually performs”.3 Practical determinism, too can be used against
free will; Neil Levy characterizes the luck problem for deterministic worlds as a “luck pincer”. He
argues that the necessary connection between agents and their decisions that makes
deterministic worlds immune to present luck correspondingly makes decisions a mere function
of the agent’s initial endowment and environment, both of which are lucky for the agent. The
combination of theoretical indeterminism and practical determinism in our world opens free will
up to two challenging luck objections. If we are to believe in free will now, we must generate an
answer to both of these troubling objections. We may eventually be rescued from one luck
objection by empirical findings, but until then we are on our own.
I am to show that convincing responses to both the problem of present luck and the “luck
pincer” can be developed. I also offer an example of an account of free will consistent with both
responses and the scientific consensus view of the world. For consistency, I will focus on the
luck objections provided by Neil Levy in “Hard Luck” and Alfred Mele’s work regarding present
luck in “Free Will and Luck”. I argue that Frankfurt examples modified to remove technical
indeterminism from the actual sequence render present luck unproblematic in our practically
deterministic world. To supplement this argument I shall show that one may adopt this strategy
regardless of one’s view on the success of classical Frankfurt examples in proving determinism.
I shall also engage Mele’s worry that in situations where the final outcome or “contrastive
explanation”4 of a choice comes down to luck, that choice cannot be free.
With regards to Neil Levy’s “luck pincer” I will argue that the deterministic hor Certainly
it's the case that at every point before the agent's decision is actually finalized it's up to quantum
mechanics to swoop in and change the decision.n of the pincer is not lethal to free will. I will
argue that an (ahistorical) account of free will in which the origin of the agent’s endowment is
3
4

I will be referring frequently to Neil Levy’s luck objections in “Hard Luck”
From Alfred Mele’s “Free Will and Luck” Ch.3
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irrelevant to freedom is resilient to this objection. By grounding free action in decisions that
spring directly from an endowment, free will can be attained even if the formation and alteration
of that endowment is always lucky for the agent. I will argue that a decision is free, so long it is
a direct application of the agent’s character to the perceived situation and endowment-driven
decisions qualify as such direct applications. I shall then reconcile an ahistorical version of free
will to cases of manipulation and explain why these cases are not overly damaging to the view.
Finally, I will argue that real world cases of “direct outpouring” frequently overlap real world
cases that are analogous to anti-luck Frankfurt examples.

1.Frankfurt examples and Present Luck
The following adaptation of the problem of present luck makes use of Levy’s definition of luck to
generate the worry that indeterminism renders free choice impossible:
1. When indeterminism plays a final role in an agent’ decision making process, nothing
about that agent is sufficient to necessitate her decision.
2. If nothing about an agent necessitates her decision, then the deciding factor of that
decision is external to the agent and outside of the agent’s control.
3. When indeterminism plays a final role in an agent’s decision making process, the
deciding factor in a decision is external to the agent and outside of the agent’s control.
(1,2 MP)
4. If a fact is external to an agent and outside of her control, and significant for that agent,
that fact is lucky for that agent.
5. When indeterminism plays a final role in an agent’s decision making process, the
deciding factors in significant decisions are lucky for the choosing agents. (3,4)MP
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6. If the deciding factor in a decision is lucky, the chooser does not exercise free will in that
decision.
7. When indeterminism plays a direct role in the choosing process, choosers do not
exercise free will in significant decisions. (5,6)MP
8. indeterminism plays a final role in the choosing process.
9. Choosers do not exercise free will in significant decisions (7,8)MP
Essentially, Levy claims that in indeterministic worlds, agents cannot necessitate any
particular outcome of a decision. Quantum indeterminacy plays a final role in the fulfillment or
frustration of the agent’s normal choosing process. Since a final step in the choosing process-the behavior of quantum particles--is outside of the agent’s control, and is genuinely
indeterministic, it counts as lucky5 for her, provided the decision is significant. Quantum
fluctuations are “final” in the sense that they possess a sort of “veto power” over the agent’s
mental state and deliberation. In an indeterministic world such as ours, there is always the
potential for a random last-minute indeterministic override to alter what the agent chooses. As
such, a decision-determining factor in indeterministic decisions is lucky and the agent does not
exercise free will in that decision. Since this logic applies to all significant decisions, the
argument’s conclusion eliminates free will for all significant decisions. Significant here should
be understood in the broadest sense, as “making any difference at all”, and the agent need not
be aware of her choice’s significance. The conclusion is clearly unacceptable for most
defenders of free will, so they must find some way to question its soundness.
Since my response to the problem of present luck revolves around the adaptation of
classic Frankfurt examples (I will refer to Frankfurt examples concerned with proving alternate
possibilities are not required for free will as classic), a brief summary of these influential cases is

5

A more rigorous explication of the concept of luck can be found in “Hard Luck” Ch.2
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in order. Classic Frankfurt examples are putative counterexamples to the statement, “if an
agent does could not have done otherwise than act how he did, then he is not morally
responsible for that decision”.
In classic Frankfurt examples, the manipulative Black is dead set on our chooser Jones
acting according to his plan. The original case continues as follows:
“Black does nothing unless it is clear to him…that Jones is going to decide to do
something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is
going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones
decides to do...what [Black] wants him to do… Now suppose that Black never has to
show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does
perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones
will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have born
if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it.”6

The critical feature of the Frankfurt case is the isolation of the feature of the world that
eliminates Jones’ possibilities from the real-world. Black’s manipulation plays no role in the
actual sequence of Jones’ decision, and thus Jones chooses exactly as he would if he had truly
had said alternatives. Thus, the recipe for a frankfurt example is to construct a situation where
the supposedly necessary condition is absent, but its absence has no effect on the actual
decision. As such, we are left with a situation in which the lack of a supposedly essential factor
cannot affect the situation’s end result.
Tweaking the formula presented by classic Frankfurt examples can provide just this
response by providing a counterexample to premise (6) If the deciding factor in a decision is

6

From Frankfurt “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” p 835-836.
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lucky, the chooser does not exercise free will in that decision. Applying the method of Frankfurt
examples, we set out to create a case where the deciding factor in a decision is lucky, but the
chooser still manages to act freely. We do this by relegating the “luckiness” of the choice to
counterfactual space, and letting the situation play out as it would in a luckless scenario. I will
describe such cases directed at highlighting the irrelevence of luck as “anti-luck” Frankfurt
examples.
Consider the following case. Black and Jones inhabit a technically indeterministic but
practically deterministic world much like ours! Suppose further that in this world, normal
decision-making processes are deterministic. Given his extensive information on Jones’ mental
states, Black knows that Jones will act in a very boring and practical manner. Being a tad
eccentric, Black wishes to interject a little chaos into the situation. He installs an indeterministic
device in Jones’ brain, which uses genuinely random quantum processes to simulate 100 coin
flips. If all of the flips come up “heads”, the device will deterministically override Jones’ decision
to the most fun and spontaneous alternative (as programmed by Black). The box remains
inactive for the entire deliberative process, simulating its flips and either interfering at the
moment of Jones’ decision or remaining dormant the entire time. Unsurprisingly, in the actual
world at least one flip is tails, and Jones proceeds to decide exactly as he would have in the
nearest deterministic universe. The box very explicitly makes Jones’ ultimate decision a matter
of luck, yet in no way interferes with Jones’ decision. Black later responds to the accusation
that he has rendered Jones’ decision unfree by pointing out that his box had no more influence
on Jones’ decision than the music box his daughter had been using at the time. He argues that
if Jones did not decide freely, Black’s box is certainly not the cause of this limitation.
One important point demands clarification: even if successful this anti-luck Frankfurt
case does not constitute a strict counterexample. After all, if for some reason Jones did not
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have free will to begin with, Black’s tampering will certainly not restore it.7 What the example
does show; however, is that-in practically deterministic choices-lucky factors are no danger to
the agent’s free will provided they don’t interfere significantly with the causal chain. Thus, antiluck Frankfurt examples move the question of free will back a step, to whether free will is
possible in a practically deterministic world. To answer that question in the affirmative is beyond
the scope of this paper. But the ultimate success of anti-luck Frankfurt examples is related to
the success of my response to the luck pincer in the sense that the success of the latter offers a
good reason to believe that this response to present luck is likewise fruitful, since one significant
objection to practically determinism free will has been answered. I will postpone concerns about
practically deterministic free will and move to consider possible objections to the anti-luck
Frankfurt examples in themselves.

1.1 Anticipated objections to anti-luck Frankfurt examples.
One immediate objection that may spring to mind for many libertarians is that the
classical Frankfurt examples upon which the anti-luck examples are based fail8. As such it is
possible that anti-luck cases fail in an analogous way. I will briefly sketch out the common
objections to classic Frankfurt cases and explain why similar problems do not apply to the antiluck examples. I will discuss both the “flicker of freedom” and “indeterministic world” objections.
Dismissing the “flicker of freedom” objection is the most simple of the two. Objectors
argue that for Black to be able to rule out alternate possibilities he must be able to identify some
factor in Jones’ behavior that reliably indicates his future decision to misbehave. As such, if
Jones were to act against Black’s wishes he would make some facial twitch or play with his hair

7

Unless what Jones was missing was exactly and only the sort of alternative possibilities technical
indeterminism provides. But most proponents of alternative possibilities require the agent have control
over which possibility is selected, which Jones does not.
8
I personally disagree with this statement; however, I will neglect to defend the classical Frankfurt cases
here, instead showing why the best objections to them fail to apply to anti-luck cases.
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a certain way or some other such indicator. Objectors claim that the legitimate alternative
possibility Jones had when making this sign is the act through which he can be morally
responsible for his eventual decision. Fortunately, similar objections do not apply to anti-luck
examples. While it is true that Jones’ previous choices were not subject to present luck at any
time before the moment of his decision, it is not the case that the presence or absence of any
previous indeterministic luck has any impact on whether the deciding factor in this decision is
lucky. The indeterminism box is completely insensitive to Jones’ history. Put simply, an agent
cannot be free from luck in any particular decision solely in virtue of some fact about a previous
decision.
The “indeterministic world” objection to classic Frankfurt cases can be sketched as
follows in argument form:
1.Jones inhabits either a deterministic or indeterministic world.
2.If Jones’ world is indeterministic Black cannot know with certainty that Jones will not
decide contrary to his expectation.
3. If Jones’ world is deterministic Black’s meddling is inconsequential to his lack of
alternative possibilities.
4.if Jones inhabits an indeterministic world then Black fails to remove all alternative
possibilities
5. if Jones inhabits a deterministic world then Black’s meddling is irrelevant to the
question of moral responsibility.
6. Either Black fails to remove alternative possibilities or his meddling is irrelevant to
Jones’ moral responsibility.
7. So classic Frankfurt examples fail to demonstrate that alternate possibility is
unnecessary for moral responsibility
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Regardless of the success of such objections against classic examples, there is no
vagueness about the sort of world Jones inhabits in the anti-luck example. It is explicitly stated
that anti-luck Jones inhabits a technically indeterministic but practically deterministic world. It is
no coincidence that this is exactly the world described by the current scientific consensus, since
this paper is directed at developing answers to the luck problems that arise in what scientists
believe is the actual world. The technical indeterminism is consistent with the sort of genuinely
random event required in the example, so there is no hidden ambiguity about the state of the
world in anti-luck examples to be scrutinized.
Alfred Mele has characterized a parallel worry regarding present luck in indeterministic
worlds by referring to contrastive explanation9. It is worth asking if anti-luck Frankfurt examples
fail to secure free will from worries regarding contrastive explanation that spring from present
luck. Mele voices the worry that-in indeterministic worlds-for any agent X who chooses action
A, there is an identical agent X* in a nearby possible world who chooses something other than
A. Since the agents are exactly identical up to the moment of decision, the difference between
the two worlds that explains the X’s diverging choice must be completely external to X, a matter
of luck.
Let us put our anti-luck Jones in Mele’s framework and see how his free will holds up.
As per Mele’s objection, there exists a nearby Jones* who makes the fun and exciting decision
Black recommends at the final moment. Moreover, in the anti-luck example, it is abundantly
clear that the factor explaining the difference in choices is Black’s indeterminism box, (more
precisely the sequence of quantum “coin flips” it simulates), a clear source of luck for Jones. So
the only difference between Jones and Jones* is a matter of luck, as Mele claims. Is this fact
cause for worrying about Jones’ free will?

9

“Free Will and Luck” p70-73, Ch.1
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I claim that there is one salient difference between Jones and Jones*, explaining why
Jones is exercising free will in the situation. For Jones*, the indeterminist box overrides his
determining natural proclivity towards boring action. Jones* is a victim-or perhaps beneficiaryof luck. Jones, in contrast, is completely unaffected by the indeterminist box, and chooses
normally according to his personality, rational capacities and assessment of the situation. The
luck introduced into the situation by Black’s box fails to causally interact with him in any way.
The difference between Jones and Jones* is merely a matter of luck, but that luck matters only
for Jones*.
One way Mele motivates the problem from contrastive explanation is to question the
legitimacy of aiming differing moral judgements at identical agents who differ only in regard to
their good or bad luck in making a particular choice. Can we blame Jones for his boring
decision, or praise Jones* for his exciting decision, given that the difference between their
choices is a matter of luck? It seems that we can hold Jones responsible; his decision to act
boringly was not influenced by luck at all. In contrast, Jones* acted in an exciting matter only
because of Black’s box. His decision to act excitingly is merely the result of a series of unlikely
quantum swerves in the box, and are not a consequence of his beliefs, values or deliberation.
Because of this we can justifiably criticize Jones for his boring action, although we cannot praise
Jones* for his exciting choice. Although the contrastive explanation of the differing choices
indeed makes exclusive reference to luck, luck plays no part in the actual explanation of Jones
choice; he acts exactly as he would in a luckless world. It is the presence of luck in the actual
explanation of Jones*’s decision that makes his action unfree.
It may be legitimately charged that anti-luck Frankfurt examples only answer the problem
of present luck in certain specific situations. Because of this, it may be thought their utility in
defense of free will is highly limited. For instance, in the anti-luck case, the indeterministic
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factors of the universe are completely external to his decision process. In the real world;
however, quantum events occurring in our brains are necessary components of our decisionmaking in the direct physical sense. Does this disanalogy cripple anti-luck cases? The answer
seems to be no, on the level of the neurons, quantum fluctuations rarely, if ever, have any
impact. They are technically a component of decision making processes, but as with Black’s
box, quantum fluctuations are capable of having a significant impact on decision making only on
massively lucky occasions. Like the box they can, in principle, significantly impact decisions,
but in situations where they do not, quantum fluctuations likewise pose no threat to free will.
But the objector’s initial point still stands; anti-luck cases only successfully resist free will
when lucky elements fail to override the decision the agent would make in a nearby
deterministic world. If Jones were incapable of deterministically choosing between the boring
and exciting choice, Black’s box would clearly make his eventual decision a matter of luck,
regardless of whether or not it was activated. When there is no sufficient cause within the agent
for making a particular choice, any chancy deciding factor is capable of rendering the decision a
matter of luck. It is only in cases where the agent is significantly or even drastically in favor of
one choice over the other that present luck is irrelevant. The exact number of this significance
threshold is vague, but it is certainly satisfied if the chance of failure is less than the chance of
100 coins flipping heads. And the scientific consensus is that the possibility of a series of
quantum fluctuations occurring being sufficient to override an entrenched decision with a
significant deliberative process is certainly below that threshold. As such, in situations where
the agent is vastly predisposed in favor of a certain decision and no lucky factor interferes with
that decision, the fact that the decision’s determining factor is lucky fails to undermine that
agent’s free will.
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2. Practical determinism and the Luck Pincer
While I have been leaning heavily on Neil Levy’s definition of luck to characterize the
problem of present luck, Levy himself agrees that “Libertarianism can dispense with chanciness
by borrowing...heavily from compatibilism”10. Levy allows that “real world” accounts of free will
that are technically indeterministic but practically deterministic can withstand the problem of
present luck by itself. But Levy claims deterministic accounts of free will are vulnerable to a
“luck pincer”, which combines Issues of indeterministic and deterministic luck.
Here is a summary of Neil Levy’s “Luck Pincer”11
1. A deterministic agent’s endowment12 is purely a matter of luck for that agent.
2. External deliberation-influencing factors are lucky for a deterministic agent.
3. If an agent’s endowment at a given time is a matter of luck, so are the decisions settled
by that endowment.
4. Decisions completely settled by an agent’s endowment are a matter of luck for that
agent. (1,3) MP
5. To the extent that an agent’s endowment fails to completely settle a decision, her
decision is decided by external factors which are lucky for that agent. (2)
6. A deterministic agent’s decisions are always settled by a combination of her endowment
and external factors.
7. A deterministic agent’s decisions are always a matter of luck for her. (4,5,6)

10

Levy “Hard Luck” 77.
Ibid. argument adapted from Ch.4.
12
Levy defines an endowment as the collection of an agent’s desires, beliefs, values and deliberative
tendencies.
11
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8. Decisions that are a matter of luck cannot be free.
9. Deterministic agents cannot act freely. (7,8)MP
The force behind Levy’s argument comes from two complementary sources: initial
endowments and external environmental factors. Our initial endowments are indeed lucky for
us. We exercise no control over them, they are highly significant for us, and are drastically
different for many others. Conjointly, this lack of control, high significance and variation across
individuals is sufficient for the selection of our initial endowment to count as lucky. Additionally,
in a deterministic world, decisions our endowments leave “up in the air” must be settled by
external factors (usually during the deliberative process). Subconscious influences brought on
by physical circumstances frequently influence our moods. Environmental inputs can also
determine which deliberative considerations are brought to mind in deliberation or left unnoticed.
A radio melody can remind us to consider our mother, youth, or how much we hate our
neighbor. The “gaps” our endowments bring to difficult decisions are settled in one way or
another by these external lucky factors. On the surface, it appears as if deterministic agents are
besieged by luck on all sides.
I will offer an argument for the conclusion that decisions resulting from our endowments
are free. I will claim that my argument is superior to Levy’s because the individual premises are
more reasonable than Levy’s (3) If an agent’s endowment at a given time is a matter of luck, so
are the decisions settled by that endowment. Specifically, I will argue that my second premise
is significantly more firmly established than (3). As such, readers should prefer my argument to
Levy’s. I shall refer to my argument as “the Outpouring argument” to differentiate it from Levy’s
“Luck Pincer”. I shall refer to my preferences in shorthand by (O1) for premise 1 to avoid
confusion.
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1. If a choice is the direct outpouring13 of who we are at the moment we make it that choice
is free.
2. In situations where our endowment (desires, values, deliberative tendencies) is sufficient
to (practically) determine our decisions, our choice is the direct outpouring of who we are
at the moment we make it.
3. In situations where our endowment is sufficient to practically determine our decisions,
our choice is free. (1,2) MP
My sub-argument for (2) runs as follows:
a. Suppose not (2). Then there exists some component of our identity relevant to
decision making not expressed in the normal application of our endowment.
b. But there is no such component of our identity.
c. So (2). (a,b CONT)

2.1 Anticipated objections to Outpouring Argument
Since the Outpouring Argument is valid, objectors will likely take issue with either
premise (O1) or (O2). I will discuss (O1) only briefly, as it strikes me as generally
uncontroversial. (O1) states If a choice is the direct outpouring of who we are at the moment we
make it that choice is free. I am not sure what could be expected of free will other than that it
allows us to be the direct causes of our decisions in the absence of external interference. Luck
objections, alternate possibility worries, and concerns about divine foreknowledge all seem at
their core to object to outpouring. The primary worry of these objections is some factor outside
of the agent’s normal decision-making method is actually responsible for some significant
portion of decisions. It is informative that there is no “agential” problem of free will; the

13

I am simply using outpouring as a term for the natural application of our endowment to the perceived
situation. Significant outside interference in the decision constitutes a violation of the outpouring
condition.
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possibility that the agent makes her own decision according to her rationality and perceived
judgment is a desired outcome for nearly all free will defenders. That said, an argument
demonstrating that agents must rely on some would be highly interesting and informative, and I
would welcome such a unique response.
The second claim is the more contentious of the two: (O2) In situations where our
endowment (reasons, values, deliberative tendencies) is sufficient to (practically) determine our
decisions, our choice is the direct outpouring of who we are at the moment we make it. I will not
discuss issues relating to present luck in this segment since my defense is recorded above. As
indicated in my sub-argument, if the natural application of our endowment to our perceived
circumstances fails to constitute the natural outpouring of who we are, there must be some part
of our identity relevant to decision making that fails to be expressed in our endowment. The
obvious question arises naturally; what could this additional part of us possibly be? It cannot be
our deliberative tendencies, desires, values or the like since those are explicitly contained in our
endowment. It is part of us, so external factors are also ruled out. The extra factor supposedly
necessary for a decision to count as a direct outpouring is thus nothing in what is generally
accepted to be our normal decision making process, and nothing external to our character. We
are looking for some hidden corner of our agency that is both necessary our decision to be a
natural extension of who we are and not contained in the complete picture of our desires,
values, memories, deliberative nature, or character.
This quandary brings to mind the mysterious extra factors frequently offered in response
to the problem of present luck. Ironically, such ideas here do more to hamper the cause of free
will than to promote it. In this case; however, it is not enough for objectors to suggest that these
factors exist and help enhance agential freedom. It must be argued that these factors are also
essential to our agency so that an action cannot be a direct outpouring of who we are without
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their application. Such a significant metaphysical claim would require its own paper to address,
but suppose for a moment there does exist some additional component of our agency whose
intervention was necessary for direct outpouring and presumably free action. Agentcausationists, for example, might champion the existence of some such component of our
identity. Since this extra factor might not be expressible through normal means, it is now
possible that decisions from our endowment may not be direct outpourings of who we are at the
moment, since those decisions will fail to reflect this non-physical yet essential aspect of our
identity.
Despite this possibility, the outpouring argument is only in danger if this factor for some
reason cannot be expressed in normal deterministic decision-making processes. To claim both
that some external factor exists that is both necessary for us to choose as a direct outpouring of
our agency and cannot be exercised in conjunction with our endowment is a high standard
indeed. The outpouring argument need not fear this eventuality until significant work is done
showing its plausibility.
There is room in the logical space for another objection. There may be some factor
necessary for a decision to qualify as a direct outpouring that simply does not exist in agents in
our world. To make this claim; however, is largely ad hoc, as there is no legitimate preliminary
reason to believe such a factor exists. On the face of it, if you were divinely guaranteed that
your actions would stem directly from your values, desires, character and assessment of the
situation without interference, would your initial response be one of skepticism about your ability
to make decisions as direct outpourings of your character? Your divine blessing guarantees
that outside factors will not intervene or determine your deliberations; your decisions are always
determined by the normal application your nature as a rational agent to the situation at hand. If
this is not sufficient for a choice to be a direct outpouring of who you are, what is?
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In summary, I argue that the premises of my response to Levy, especially the weakest
premise, (O2) In situations where our endowment (desires, values, deliberative tendencies) is
sufficient to (practically) determine our decisions, our choice is the direct outpouring of who we
are at the moment we make it. I claim that if (O2) is false, there must exist some integral
choice-making aspect of our agency outside of and incapable of being implemented through our
endowment. Since such a factor is unlikely to exist, we have drastic reason to prefer the
acceptance of (O2) than to Levy’s (3) If an agent’s endowment at a given time is a matter of
luck, so are the decisions settled by that endowment. Suppose you buy an orange at the store,
and your current endowment is strongly inclined towards oranges by luck. This does not make
your decision for an orange lucky for you now. After all, in a very important, perhaps even
comprehensive sense, you are your endowment. Given this, you may be lucky to be the way
you are, but your choice to buy the orange stemmed directly from your character at the moment
you made the decision. To claim that this constitutes not only luck, but luck of the significant
and unacceptable variety is rightly viewed with suspicion. I hope I have convinced my readers
likewise.

3.Conclusion
Scientific consensus opens up free will defenders to objections based in both
nondeterministic and deterministic aspects of the world. Technical indeterminism makes free
will vulnerable to the problem of present luck. Anti-luck Frankfurt examples can diffuse this
worry in situations where luck fails to intervene with the chooser’s actual sequence. Neil Levy’s
luck pincer creates a parallel worry that combines the question of present luck with a new,
deterministic element. Since our endowments are generated and impacted heavily by lucky
factors outside our control, decisions that spring from them must also be a matter of luck.

I

argue that in such situations, endowment-driven decisions can still be the direct outpouring of

20
The Curse of Fortune; Responding to Luck Objections in an Uncooperative World.
who we are at the moment, since our endowments are so integral to our identities. Taken
together, both of my responses to luck problems secure free will from both halves of the luck
pincer in cases where an agent’s endowment practically determines their decision. In this way, I
hope that without recourse to other responses, a view where practically determined decisions
can be free regardless of luck’s influence. It is my hope that the arguments advanced in this
paper will prove useful to defenders of free will who share my interest in defending free will from
the unique problems posed by world we (probably) inhabit.
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